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ABSTRACT 
The main aims of the dissertation are to develop an economic simulation 
model of the Zimbabwean economy for the 1980-2000 period and to use the 
model developed to simulate alternative policies to those of the economic 
structural adjustment program for that period. 
The dissertation includes a review of the theoretical framework underlying the 
economic structural adjustment program in Zimbabwe. Economic structural 
adjustment programs are discussed in terms of the three main pillars of the 
'Washington Consensus': budget .austerity, privatization and liberalization. 
Problems arising from the consensus are identified. 
A brief discussion 9f the Zimbabwean economy is presented. This discussion 
covers a range of aspects of importance for the dissertation, for example, the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the nature of the Zimbabwean 
economy at the time of independence in 1980, reasons for the implementation 
of a structural adjustment program in 1990. 
A simulation model of the Zimbabwean economy is developed using a 
Keynesiasn, simple macro-economic framework. The model constructed 
reflects the linkages between the various sectors and assumptions made. 
ii 
about the economic relationships. Stella 8 software is used in to develop the 
model. 
The modeling process has two phases. In phase one the model is tested; in 
phase two alternative policy settings of an increase in government 
expenditure and a decrease in the rate of interest are simulated. Results 
indicate that the alternative policies may have been preferred 
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1.0 Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have used 
economic structural adjustment programs (ESAP) over the last two decades 
as part of their lending structure for developing countries. The success of 
these programs has, however, been debatable. Leading economists, such as 
Stiglitz, have criticized these programs. Zimbabwe is one country that 
underwent structural reform, using the economic structural adjustment 
program as its base. However, as shown in this dissertation, the results have 
been far from what was intended 
1.1 The research question 
The research question for this dissertation is: given the failure of the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programs implemented in Zimbabwe 
between 1990 - 1995, would alternative policies have been more successful? 
In addressing this question, the first aim of this dissertation is to build an 
economic model, based on the Stella 8 software, of Zimbabwe for the period 
1980-1998. The model was built using the STELLA Research Software (High 
Performance Systems, Inc. 2000). The second aim is to use the model to 
explore the outcomes of alternative policies from the time when ESAP was 
implemented (1990) to the end of the program (2000). 
1.2 The structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows; 
Chapter 2: Literature review. This chapter presents a review of the literature 
relevant for the dissertation. The main focus of the chapter is on 
economic structural adjustment programs and their three main 
pillars (privatization, liberalization and budget austerity). 
Chapter 3: Zimbabwe and the economic structural adjustment program. 
This chapter will focus on the Zimbabwean economy. It will 
discuss the reasons why ESAP was implemented, the results of 
ESAP and, finally, the lessons learnt from ESAP in Zimbabwe. 
Chapter 4: Model development. The main objectives of the chapter are to, 
first, explain in some detail how the model of the Zimbabwean 
economy is developed and, second, to present the two 
alternative policies that are going to be simulated with the 
model. 
Chapter 5: Results. In this chapter, the results of the developed model and 
the results of the alternative policies simulated with the model 
are presented and discussed. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion. This chapter concludes the dissertation by 
reporting on the significance of the results obtained in Chapter 
five noting limitations of the study, and introducing implications 
for further research. 
2 
1.3 Justification of the Research 
There are a number of reasons for the selection of the research question. 
First, ESAP was a major program implemented in Zimbabwe to initiate growth 
after its independence in 1980. A number of Zimbabwean economists 
(Tande, C., Robertson, J., & Murata, C.) believe that this was the beginning of 
Zimbabwe's economic problems. By understanding what went wrong and by 
seeing if different economic policies would have been more successful, future 
policies could avoid some of the mistakes made in the past. 
Second, most of the research on the ESAP in Zimbabwe has highlighted its 
failure and the lessons that have been learnt from the program. This 
dissertation aims to extend such research by simulating and evaluating 
alternative policies. 
Third, by using simulation-based software (STELLA), the research will add to 
the current economic literature on Zimbabwe. Research conducted to date 
has used traditional econometric models. The software chosen for this 
research allows the Zimbabwean economy to be modeled as a system, rather 
than as a linear econometric model. 
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2.0 Introduction 
Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter presents a review of the literature of relevance for the 
dissertation. It focuses on the literature on economic structural adjustment 
programs and the three main pillars associated with such programs. 
The chapter is organized as follows: 
2. 1: Economic structural adjustment programs: a brief history. In this 
section, a brief history of economic structural adjustment programs is 
provided. 
2.2: Structural adjustment programs and the Washington consensus. In this 
section, a definition of structural adjustment programs is presented, 
and Williamson's ten common denominators ('the Washington 
consensus') for such programs are introduced. Discussion of the 
Washington consensus in this dissertation will center on Stiglitz's three 
main pillars (budget austerity, privatization and liberalization). 
2.3: Budget austerity. This section focuses on the importance of 
government spending for the performance of an economy. It shows 
how a reduction in government expenditure in third world countries 
could cause a recession. 
2.4: Privatization. This section explains the theory of privatization, its 
strengths and weaknesses, and the pre-conditions that need to exist 
for privatization to be implemented successfully. 
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2.5: Liberalization. This section discusses briefly the concept of market 
liberalization, the policies used to attain liberalization, the theory of 
liberalization and the role of liberalization in economic structural 
adjustment programs. 
2.1 A Brief history of economic structural adjustment programs 
Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are linked with the operation of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This fund is a specialized agency of the 
United Nations system set up by a treaty in 1945 to help promote the health of 
the world economy. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., it is governed by a 
global membership of 184 countries. The International Monetary Fund's 
statutory purposes include: promoting the balanced expansion of world trade, 
the stability of exchange rates, the avoidance of competitive currency 
devaluations, and the orderly correction of a country's balance of payments 
problems (IMF 2005). 
When the IMF was founded, it adopted the fundamental insights of 
Keynesianism. After the Second World War, the IMF's main goal was to help 
prevent another worldwide depression, like that of the 1930s, which was 
caused by a liquidity failure. The IMF was intended to counter such a 
possibility by lending money to some countries and pressuring others to 
pursue more expansionary policies (Serin & Arycan n.d). 
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In the 1970s, IMF lending to developing countries rose to unprecedented 
levels. This was because most of the developing countries were experiencing 
balance of payments problems caused by falls in commodity prices and 
reduced external financing (Serin & Arycan n.d). 
The 1980 announcement by Mexico that it was unable to service its debt led 
to the IMF changing its lending structure. This led to the cessation of 
voluntary lending to less developed countries. Ferreira (1992, p.10) states that 
'the age of concerted lending, aimed only at "rolling over" existing debt, 
commenced'. The huge current account deficits of many less developed 
countries now had to be financed without any foreign capital inflows. 
Thus, adjustment in the 1980s was to acquire a new face. This meant that 
the IMF would give loans with conditions. These conditions would be in the 
form of policy settings that comprised what was termed 'structural adjustment 
programs'. Many countries in the 1980s agreed to these conditional loans 
because of their liquidity problems and the fact that they had a limited number 
of options available to them (Ferreira 1992). This was the dawn of a new era: 
the era of conditional lending to countries in transition. 
In this new era spanning over two decades, Ghana is one country for which 
structural adjustment programs have been hailed a success. Kapur, 
Hadjimichael, Hibers, Schiff & Szmczak (1991, p.1 ), state that: 
. . . over the past eight years, Ghana has pursued a comprehensive 
program of financial and structural reforms, which has come to be 
perceived as an example of adjustment with growth .... As a 
consequence, Ghana 's economic and financial performance has 
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improved substantially after a prolonged period of decline, even though 
a number of structural and institutional constraints continue to confront 
the economy. 
Although the IMF and World Bank use Ghana as a benchmark for successful 
Structural Adjustment, others view the story far less positively. Green (1987) 
argues that the results of the program were mixed and that several 
weaknesses emerged. These weaknesses raise doubts as to whether its 
targets were comprehensive enough and its instruments appropriate. Kraus 
(1991) argues that the economic gains have not made a significant difference 
in the living standards of most Ghanaians. However, Leith (1996) argues that 
the reforms have made a difference. That is, output is now substantially 
greater than it otherwise would have been. 
2.2 Structural adjustment programs and the Washington consensus 
Economic structural adjustment programs are defined by Van den Brink 
(1999, p.3) as a: 
... set of fundamental economic reforms to change the structure of an 
economy from an inward-looking, protectionist, state-controlled, capita/-
intensive and exclusive economy to an outward-looking, competitive, 
market-based, employment-intensive and inclusive economy. 
Van den Brink (1999) argues that countries adjust to internal or external 
"shocks" or to new environments. Countries adjusting do not ask whether or 
not to adjust; they ask how they are going to adjust. Hussain & Stern (1992) 
define structural adjustment programs in two parts. The first part of such a 
program consists of stabilization policies which aim to achieve broad 
macroeconomic equilibrium; that is, to reduce inflation to acceptable levels, to 
raise employment to levels compatible with non-accelerating inflation, and to 
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reduce current account deficits. This is to be achieved by affecting the level 
and composition of aggregate demand. 
The second part of structural adjustment is to increase the efficiency with 
which agents perform their roles and allocate their resources. It has more of a 
"supply-side" focus. Hussain & Stern (1992) argue that stabilization tries to 
move the economy to the intersection of goods, labor and assets markets 
equilibrium, as well as balance of payments equilibrium, while structural 
adjustment aims to move the economy from within the production possibility 
set to its boundary. 
Lawson (1995) states that stabilization policies seek to achieve external and 
internal equilibrium, while structural adjustment is to foster growth. 
Williamson (1990) argues that one interpretation of the 'Washington 
Consensus' is that stabilization represents a prior condition for structural 
adjustment (African alternative framework to structural adjustment programs 
for socio-economic recovery and transformation 1991 ). 
On the basis of the concept of structural adjustment briefly outlined above, a 
number of key policy instruments were designed for stabilization and 
adjustment programs by both the IMF and the World Bank. These 
instruments included: 
• 'removal of restrictions on foreign investments in local financial industry 
services, 
• reorientation of economies towards exports, 
• reduction of wages, or constraining wage increases, 
• reduction in government spending, 
• reductions of restrictions to imports, 
• devaluation of local currencies, 
• privatization of state enterprises, and 
• deregulation of corporations' (Bello 1996, p.25). 
Williamson (1989) referred to these policy instruments collectively as the 
"Washington Consensus". He used the phrase in the sense of the lowest 
common denominator of policy advice being offered by the Washington-based 
institutions to Latin American and sub-Saharan African countries. 
Stiglitz (2002) derived three main pillars of the Washington consensus from 
the list of instruments stated above. They were budget austerity, privatization 
and market liberalization. Discussion of economic structural adjustment 
programs in the following three sections of this chapter focus on these three 
main pillars. 
2.3 Budget austerity 
Budget austerity within the structural adjustment program is based on the 
argument that increased government spending can induce increases in 
interest rates and result in inflation (via the multiplier effect on output). Such 
an outcome is predicted from the condition for equilibrium in the goods market 
model, as noted by Blanchard (2000, p.383): 
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Where; 
• 1;1-C1 = the multiplier; 
C = autonomous consumption; • 0 
• 
1 = investment; 
• G = government expenditure; 
• 
NX = net exports; 
• y = production; 
• ; = domestic interest rate; 
• i* = foreign interest rate; 
• Ee = expected future exchange rate (assumed be constant); 
• Y = domestic income; and 
• Y* = income for rest of the world. 
This equation shows equilibrium output to be the level of output such that 
aggregate supply equals aggregate demand. Blanchard (2000) notes that, in 
this model, the second term [C0 + I + NX +G - (C1 T)] can be termed 
"autonomous spending", where investment and net exports are assumed to 
be autonomous. The model allows the working out of the effects of an 
increase or decrease in government expenditure on output and other 
variables. 
Blanchard (2000, p.387), states: 
. . . an increase in government spending leads to an increase in 
demand, leading to an increase in output. As output increases, so 
does the demand for money, leading to upward pressure on the 
interest rate. The increase in the interest rate, which makes domestic 
bonds more attractive, also leads to an appreciation of the domestic 
currency. Both the higher interest rate and the appreciation decrease 
the domestic demand for goods, offsetting some of the effect of 
government spending on demand and output. 
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This is shown in Figure 2.0. 
Figure 2.0: Effects of an increase in government expenditure. 
Source: 
y 
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Blanchard, O 2000, Macroeconomics, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, Australia, p. 
389. 
The economy is initially at point A in diagram (a). An increase in government 
expenditure from G to G' increases output at a given interest rate, shifting the 
IS curve to the right, from IS to IS'. Because government spending does not 
enter the LM relation, the LM curve does not shift. The new equilibrium is at 
point A', with a higher level of output and a higher interest rate. As is shown 
in figure (b ), the higher interest rate leads to a decrease in the exchange rate 
- an appreciation of the domestic currency in the model. Therefore, an 
increase in government spending would lead to an increase in output, an 
increase in the interest rate, and an appreciation of the exchange rate. The 
opposite is also true. That is, a decrease in government expenditure leads to 
a decrease in output, a lower interest rate and a depreciation of the currency. 
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The problem is that if third world governments decrease their expenditure it 
could cause a recession. The reason is that in many developing countries 
governments employ the majority of the labor force and are responsible for 
contributing to a high percentage of aggregate demand. A reduction in 
government expenditure, and the method of its implementation in countries 
that are under- going transition, incorporates the other two pillars of the 
Washington Consensus (privatization and liberalization). 
discussed in the following two sections of the chapter. 
2.4 Privatization 
These are 
The major areas of expenditure for governments in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
state-owned enterprises (often claimed to be inefficient and to be running 
losses) and public sectors with huge wage bills. As Stiglitz (2002) argues, 
governments usually perform functions that they have no business 
performing. However, policies used to handle fiscal austerity are not singular 
but are incorporated in the other two pillars of the 'Washington Consensus": 
privatization and liberalization. 
According to Aktan (n.d), the concept of privatization has not been clarified, 
either in theory or practice. Bailey (1987, p.138) notes that: 
... one of the concepts in vogue is privatization. Although the concept 
itself is unclear, it might be tentatively defined as a general effort to 
relieve the disincentives toward efficiency in public organizations by 
subjecting them to the incentives of the private market. 
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Kay & Thompson (1986, p.18) agree with Bailey, noting that 'privatization is a 
term which is used to cover several distinct and possibly alternative means of 
changing the relationships between the government and private sector'. 
However, privatization is frequently referred to as the sale of publicly owned 
enterprise assets or shares to individuals or to private firms. Aktan (n.d) 
argues that this definition gives only a narrow meaning of privatization . In a 
broader sense, it refers to a restriction of the government's role and suggests 
methods or policies to strengthen the free market economy. The former 
meaning of privatization, that is, the sale of a publicly owned enterprises 
assets or shares to the private sector, is mostly called "denationalization". 
Stiglitz (2002) argues that, in many developing countries, governments all too 
often spend too much energy doing things they shouldn't do. This distracts 
them from what they should be doing. The problem is not so much that the 
government is too big, but that it is not doing the right thing. According to 
Stiglitz (2002), governments by and large have little business running steel 
mills, and usually make a mess of it. 
There are two important arguments in favor of privatization: greater efficiency 
and wide-spread private ownership (Bos 1986). The former is the result of the 
competition that denationalization brings. A competitive market creates both 
allocative and productive efficiency. Allocative efficiency means that 
economic resources can be used in the production of goods and seNices that 
people desire most. In other words, competition causes economic resources 
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to floW to their most highly valued uses (Aktan n.d). Productive efficiency 
refers to a situation in which the total output of a firm is obtained at the lowest 
possible cost in terms of economic resources. Alternatively, competition 
forces firms to produce their output at the lowest possible cost. 
Hence, Bannock, Baxter & Davies (1998) argue that privatization brings an 
end to X-inefficiencies which arise when economic resources are not being 
used at full capacity in the public sector. This happens for publicly owned 
enterprises because some of them have monopolistic status and there is little 
entrepreneurial incentive in them. Although a monopolistic, publicly owned 
enterprise could gain from reducing its costs, there is no competitive pressure 
to force it to do so. Therefore, publicly owned enterprises may use resources 
wastefully, resulting is inefficiencies in the sectors or industries. Bannock, 
Baxter & Davis (1998, p.331) argue that governments run businesses poorly 
for the following reasons: 
• 'governments are interested in improving performance of the firm for 
political gains, 
• corruption; employees are hired for political rather than business 
reasons, 
• companies may have social goals rather than business ones, and 
• nationalized industries are prone to political interference'. 
In particular, the first and last reasons are important because funds are 
scarce: if the government-run companies are losing money, or if they are not 
as profitable as possible, these funds are unavailable to other, more efficient 
14 
. Thus the efficient firms will have a harder time finding capital, making it firms. , 
difficult tor them to raise production and create more employment. 
However, privatization faces problems in its implementation. As Stiglitz 
(2002) emphasizes, there are some preconditions that have to be satisfied 
before privatization can contribute to an economy's growth. Moreover, the 
way privatization is implemented makes a difference. Some of these issues 
are discussed below. 
The timing and planning of the privatization process is important. With 
privatization, timing is an issue: it is necessary to make a time schedule in 
order to reach a successful outcome. Aktan (n.d, p.2) argues that the stages 
listed below must be followed during the implementation stage to achieve the 
required result: 
• 'promotion of the privatization program and the strategy to the public, 
• preliminary studies on various sectors of the economy must be 
undertaken, 
• a legal framework that facilitates privatization should be enacted, and 
• privatization should be implemented gradually'. 
The pace at which privatization is enacted is a key issue that Stiglitz (2002) 
discusses when he considers the failure of privatization in economic structural 
adjustment programs. Stiglitz (2002, p. 54) states that: 
. .. the IMF and the World Bank approached this issue rapidly during the 
1980s and 1990s, arguing that it is far more important to privatize 
quickly, with the issues of competition and regulation dealt with later. 
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St. rtz (2002) argues that, once a vested interest is created, the However, 19 1 
•ncentive and the funds, to maintain its monopoly position. 
firm has an 1 ' 
He 
. t "natural reason" why the IMF has been less concerned about points o a 
competition and regulation and the pace of implementation than it should 
have been. This is that privatization and unregulated monopolies can yield 
more revenue to the government, and the IMF focuses far more on 
macroeconomic issues, such as the size of the government's deficit, than on 
structural issues, such as the efficiency and competitiveness of the industry. 
Further, Stiglitz (2002) asserts that if a government is corrupt, there is little 
evidence that privatization will solve the problem. This may be due to the fact 
that the same government that has mismanaged the firm will also handle the 
privatization. Government officials realize that privatization does not limit 
them to the skimming of annual profits. But, by selling government 
enterprises at below market price, they get a significant percentage of the 
asset value for themselves, rather than leaving it for subsequent officeholders. 
Kay & Thompson (1986) note that advocates of privatization argue that these 
costs can be overlooked because the textbooks seem to say that once private 
property rights are clearly defined, the new owners will ensure that the assets 
are managed efficiently. Thus, the long-term would be 'bright' even if the 
short term was 'ugly'. However, Stiglitz (2002) argues that without the 
appropriate legal structure and market institutions, the new owners might 
have an incentive to strip assets rather than use them as a basis for 
expanding industry. Goorha (2000) points out that corruption is a serious 
problem for economies in transition, especially during the privatization 
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ess He suggests that government should have two main roles to play in proc · 
this process: 
• the implementation of well-defined property rights to foster competition, 
and 
• collaboration in the pursuit of economic rent. 
Goorha (2000) also argues that transaction costs are lowered, and economic 
growth encouraged, through the evolution of institutions that exploit 
opportunities by engaging in economic exchange and transformation of 
resources . By failing to perform this role efficiently, governments will increase 
the costs of transactions and lower economic growth. Governments should 
also provide public goods and services that may be under-provided by the 
private sector. 
In his study of corruption, Goorha (2000) concluded that during the 
privatization process the corruption structure in the economy changes from a 
more centralized joint monopoly to a decentralized one. This causes an 
increase in the level of corruption. He argues that the decentralized corruption 
structure is detrimental in the sense that it discourages private sector 
investment. This is because the centralized nature of a joint monopoly 
corruption structure and the strict monitoring over the activities of its members 
is encouragement to private sector investors. On the other hand, the lawless 
and unpredictable nature of a decentralized corruption structure deters 
economic activity. 
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2. 5 Liberalization 
Stiglitz (2002, p.59) defined liberalization, 'as the removal of government 
interference in financial markets, capital markets, and trade'. He adds that 
trade liberalization is supposed to increase a country's income by forcing 
resources to move from less productive uses to more productive uses (a 
consequence of the pursuit of comparative advantage). 
The World Bank ( 1994) argues that sustained economic growth requires more 
than a higher rate of investment. For example, it requires, first, the 
'unleashing' of markets so that the competition acts to improve the allocation 
of economic resources. Second, it requires getting price signals 'right' and 
creating a climate that allows businesses to respond to those signals in ways 
that increase the returns to investment. Finally, it requires that trade, 
agricultural, and other regulatory reforms be essential complements to 
reducing the government interventions that distort prices and tie up markets. 
The World Bank (1994) further asserts that any discussion of Sub-Saharan 
African trade reform, particularly import liberalization, must make two 
distinctions. First, import controls driven by short-run balance-of-payments 
problems-usually implemented through foreign exchange rationing-differ from 
the longer-term, protectionist import restrictions-usually implemented through 
tariff and non-tariff barriers. Much of the liberalization attempted has attacked 
the short-run controls . 
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The second distinction is that imports recorded in national statistics under 
official exchange rates differ from the actual quantity of imports and their 
market prices because of widespread smuggling and the commonplace 
evasion of tariffs and import controls. That is, much import liberalization in 
Africa has merely rationalized the situation in parallel markets and reallocated 
the "rents" previously embodied in official controls (World Bank 1994 ). 
Krueger (1978) identified four main phases of liberalization in Africa's trade 
regimes; complete or nearly complete government control or rationing of 
imports; heavy use of non-tariff barriers for protectionist purposes; mostly or 
exclusively tariff-based protection; and free trade. These phases are 
summarized in Table 2.0. She argued that, although the range of policies 
within each category is large, the overall framework is useful in tracking 
reform efforts. 
Table 2.0: Phases in liberalizing import regimes. 
... 
Phase Comment Examples Outside Africa 
Complete or nearly complete Usually the result of severe Peru (1987), Brazil (1966) 
government control over macroeconomic disequilibrium 
imports 
Extensive trade barriers, with Typical of highly protectionist Argentina (1970s), Brazil (1980s), 
widespread non tariff barriers import-substituting regimes India, (1970s), Turkey(early 1980s) 
Modest, mostly tariff-based Typical of most industrialized Republic of Korea (late 1980s) 
Protection countries 
Free trade or low, uniform Rare Hong Kong (ongoing), Chile 
tariffs 1980s), Argentina (early 1990s). 
Source : Chakraborty, D. 1999, 'Macroeconomic conditions and opening up -Argentina, Chile 
and India: A comparative study', Journal of Social Economics 26, 1/2/3 , p. 350. 
The World Bank ( 1994) notes that two patterns of trade reform in Africa are 
evident. The first is that most adjusting countries with flexible exchange rates 
have moved away from complete control over imports and foreign exchange 
and toward the use of extensive trade barriers, especially non-tariff barriers -
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(late 
and in some cases toward modest, mostly tariff-based protection. Some 
(Tanzania for example) have eliminated rationing but have not fully eliminated 
lists restricting allowable imports, or they have relied heavily on donor 
financing for systems of open general licenses. A few countries (notably 
Ghana) have committed themselves to making foreign exchange available 
through realistic exchange rates and to eliminating all but a few non-tariff 
barriers. 
The second pattern is evident in a group of countries that have never resorted 
to widespread foreign exchange rationing and have moved slowly toward 
import liberalization. This group includes the flexible exchange rate countries 
that never experienced a severe macroeconomic crisis, such as Zimbabwe, 
as well as the fixed exchange rate countries that maintained convertible 
currencies throughout the period. According to the World Bank (1994) there 
are four common interventions evident in import liberalization in Africa. These 
are: 
• elimination of foreign exchange rationing, 
• elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 
• reform of tariffs, and 
• implementation of regulatory barriers. 
As well increasing imports, it is vital during adjustment to increase exports so 
as to improve both economic growth and the balance of payments. Generally, 
an overvalued currency has been the primary obstacle to export growth, with 
devaluation a major part of the cure. 
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The world Bank (1994) argues that exports, especially of traditional 
agricultural commodities, have also been adversely affected by three other 
mechanisms. These are: 
• export licensing and controls over export activities (often widespread), 
• export taxes (traditionally high) as an important source of government 
revenue, and 
• marketing boards, with monopoly power over the sale of exports and over 
domestic purchases from farmers. These have reduced the profitability of 
exporting in many countries by offering export producers low prices. 
To deal with such problems, the major policy cure of depreciation of the real 
exchange rate, combined with reduced import protection, has increased the 
profitability of exports relative to the production of import substitutes or traded 
goods. However, many countries have tried to promote nontraditional 
exports, by using a variety of approaches. These are listed below: 
• 'legal provision for duty drawbacks (operating in most countries), 
• export processing zones, 
• relaxation of foreign investment codes, and 
• streamlining reporting and licensing requirements, and strengthening 
infrastructure' (World Bank 1994, p. 15). 
Stiglitz (2002) argued that moving resources from low-productivity uses to 
zero productivity ones does not enrich a country and that this is what 
happened all too often under IMF programs. It is easy to destroy jobs, and 
this is often the immediate impact of trade liberalization as inefficient 
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industries close down under pressure from international competition. Stiglitz 
(2002) highlights the point that IMF ideology holds that new, more productive 
jobs will be created as the old, inefficient jobs that have been created behind 
protectionist walls are eliminated. But this is simply not the case. 
It takes capital and entrepreneurship to create new firms and jobs. In 
developing countries, entrepreneurship is in shortage (due to a lack of 
education) as is capital (due to a lack of bank financing). The situation has 
been made worse by high interest rates - sometimes exceeding 100% -
making job and enterprise creation an impossibility, even in a good economic 
environment (World Bank 1994 ). 
According to the Washington Consensus, privatization, liberalization, and 
macro stability are supposed to create an environment that attracts 
investment. This investment in turn creates growth. That is, foreign business 
brings with it technical expertise and access to foreign markets, creating new 
employment possibilities. Foreign firms also have access to sources of 
finance. This is especially important in those developing countries where 
local financial institutions are weak (Seliger 2004 ). 
However, when foreign businesses enter a new market they often destroy 
local competitors, squashing the ambitions of small businessmen who had 
hoped to develop homegrown industries. For example, the entrance of Coca-
Cola and Pepsi overwhelms local soft drink firms who are sometimes unable 
to cope with the increased competition (Seliger 2004 ). 
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2_6 summary 
This chapter has presented a discussion of economic structural adjustment 
programs. A brief history of the role of the IMF in the world economy was 
presented first. Second, it discussed and analyzed the economic structural 
adjustment programs in relation to the three main pillars of the 'Washington 
Consensus'. Third, it highlighted the weaknesses of economic structural 
adjustment programs and preconditions that need to exist for the programs to 
be a success. 
The work of a number of researchers in this field was noted. Blanchard 
(2000) argued that budget austerity could cause a recession in developing 
countries because it will effectively reduce aggregate demand. Stiglitz (2002) 
argued that liberalization might increase a country's income, but if not 
implemented properly it could lead to high levels of unemployment with local 
firms being forced out of business by foreign competitors. 
Finally, Stiglitz (2002) argued that privatization has potential problems in its 
implementation. He notes that there are preconditions that have to be 
satisfied before privatization can contribute to an economy's growth. 
Moreover, the way privatization is implemented makes a big difference. 
Having discussed the general nature and potential problems of economic 
structural adjustment programs, the particular case of Zimbabwe may be 
explored. Chapter three discusses the Zimbabwean economy and its 
experience with economic structural adjustment programs. 
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Chapter 3 
Zimbabwe and the economic structural 
adjustment program 
3.0 Introduction 
Having discussed structural adjustment programs in terms of the relevant 
theory and its application in Chapter 2, this chapter will focus on the 
Zimbabwean economy. 
This chapter is organized as follow: 
3.1: A brief history of the Zimbabwean economy and the reasons why 
ESAP was adopted. This section presents a brief historical account of 
the Zimbabwean economy. It covers the period from around 1945 to 
1990 and outlines the state of the economy before the program was 
implemented. 
3.2: Policy settings. In this section, a review of the policy settings of the 
program is presented. It includes a summary of the policy objectives 
that needed to be satisfied by the program. 
3.3: Results and lessons learnt from the economic structural adjustment 
program. The results and the lessons learnt from the economic 
structural adjustment program are presented in this section of the 
chapter. 
24 
3.1 A brief history of the Zimbabwean economy and the reasons why 
ESAP was adopted 
After almost a century of struggle against colonial rule, and over a decade of 
bitter armed struggle when the two African liberation movements (the 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwean African 
People's Union (ZAPU)) took arms to liberate the country from white 
domination, Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980. 
This independence era was ushered in amidst a great deal of rejoicing by an 
African population brimful with optimism that the country was on the threshold 
of a new future that would be both prosperous and peaceful. The 
Zimbabwean population had every confidence that, now that a people's 
government was in power, the inequalities of the past would be redressed. 
That is, full access to education and health services, among other services, 
which had been denied the Zimbabweans under colonialism, would be 
assured to all. 
During the period of British Rule (1923 - 1965), an open economic system 
was introduced and relatively high levels of growth eventuated, mainly driven 
by strong export performance. This was in part a result of heavy investment 
in infrastructure by the government and substantial direct foreign investment. 
By 1965, the manufacturing sector was relatively well diversified and exports 
accounted for almost 40% of GDP. 
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This relative stability came under attack on November 5, 1965. The white 
minority government formally rejected calls by Britain to change to majority 
rule and declared a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). The British 
government regarded the UDI as illegal and terminated all relations with the 
country. The United Nations implemented economic sanctions and, in 1967, 
the armed struggle for majority rule began. 
As a result of the sanctions imposed on the country, it switched to import 
substitution policies. To help the development of these policies, quotas, price 
controls, investment controls, and foreign exchange allocation controls were 
introduced. During this period (1967-1970), agricultural marketing boards 
were allowed to effect price changes to stimulate food production. 
Surprisingly, relative prosperity ensued from 1967-1974 under this regime. 
However, by the late 1970s, Zimbabwe's liberation war had escalated to 
critical proportions. In December 1979, following the Lancaster House 
Conference chaired by the British, the minority rule parliament was dissolved. 
Elections for majority rule took place for the first time in February 1980, and a 
new country, Zimbabwe, was born. 
ZANU, in its earlier pre-election manifesto, had promised to build a socialist 
nation based on equity and undertook to pursue development policies for the 
benefit of the black majority. The Mugabe regime proceeded swiftly to end 
racial discrimination and enacted legislation designed to improve the quality of 
life for the Zimbabwean majority (Mlambo 1997). 
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The government aimed to expand education facilities to service those areas 
that had hitherto been ignored by the colonial administrations, and to ensure 
the provision of free primary education and health services to benefit the poor 
majority. Basic consumer goods such as mealie meal (the staple food), milk, 
cooking oil, and several other items were subsidized to make them affordable 
to the Zimbabwean poor. A minimum wage law was promulgated to ensure 
that workers received a decent wage (Mlambo 1997). 
The initial results were promising, with the quality of life of the Zimbabwean 
majority improving considerably during the first decade of independence, 
despite numerous economic, geo-political, environmental and other problems 
that faced the country between 1980 and 1990. 
Mlambo (1997) argues that despite sanctions, or perhaps because of them, 
the Zimbabwean economy was one of the most diversified in Africa by 1980. 
Not only did the country have a well-developed, highly diversified agricultural 
industry and a lucrative mining sector, it also had experienced rapid 
industrialization. 
The evidence stems from the fact that, at UDI in 1965, the country produced 
only 600 separately identifiable (manufactured) products but, by 
independence, manufactured products made in the country had increased to 
over 6000, 30% of which were exported (Baumann 1990). 
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The reality was, however, that, while the country may have been doing well, 
the majority of the people were not (Mlambo 1997). 
This was due mainly to the fact that only a small white minority of the 
Zimbabwean population enjoyed the fruits of increased productivity in the 
economy, while the African majority was marginalized, exploited or ignored. 
The country's landholding patterns were highly skewed in favor of the minority 
white population and at the expense of the African majo~ity, 60% of whom 
lived in cramped, unproductive and underdeveloped lands known as the Tribal 
Trust Lands (Mlambo 1997). 
This inequitable distribution of land had been formalized in the country's legal 
system from the early days of European colonialism. The Land Appointment 
Act of 1930, the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Land Tenure Act of 
1969 had all further entrenched the racial division of land, giving the white 
population, comprising only 4% of the total population, approximately half of 
the total land area (Mlambo 1997). 
Mlambo (1997) argues that disparities also existed in the areas of 
government-sponsored infra-structural development as the whites enjoyed 
generous government support in the construction of dams, paved roads and 
railways, while the African areas were largely neglected. 
The Zimbabwean Ministry of Finance (1986, p.49) summarized the negative 
effects of colonial land policies, stating that: 
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... the misallocation (of land under colonial rule) resulted in inefficient 
use of land and low per capita income for the majority of the 
population. Because of the relatively small areas of land allocated and 
consequent population pressure in communal lands, the poor quality of 
the land and poor agricultural support services resulting in relatively in 
unimproved traditional farming practices, the productivity of land 
progressively declined over the years. This situation, coupled with the 
discrimination led to a decline in production in communai farming areas 
whilst stimulating production in European areas. The starvation wages 
paid to commercial farm workers contributed to the high profitability on 
European farms. 
This unfair distribution of resources was accompanied by a similarly unfair 
allocation of income. The white population received incomes that were 
several times higher than the black Zimbabweans. Table 3.0 shows these 
disparities. For example, in the mining/quarrying sector, white Zimbabweans 
received more than 10 times the earnings of black Zimbabweans. There were 
three sectors in which black Zimbabweans earned incomes that were above 
Z$1000; these were finance/insurance/real estate, transport/communication 
and the health sectors. 
Table 3.0: Average annual earnings by sector and race, March 1979 
.@} 
Sector Whites Blacks 
MininQ/QuarrvinQ 7416 594 
ManufacturinQ 5796 822 
Electricitv/W ater 6315 813 
Construction 5250 648 
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 5097 1563 
Distribution/Hotels, Restaurants 4146 735 
Transport/Communication 5391 1095 
Public administration 6342 957 
Education 4389 1338 
Health 3642 1170 
Private domestic service 350 
Other services 4083 672 
Source: Zimbabwe Statistical Office, 1981, quoted in Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Zimbabwe's First Five Years, (1995). 
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With regard to the provision of social services, the picture was equally dismal. 
The urban areas, where the majority of the white population resided, had 
highly developed, well maintained and generously funded health, transport, 
communication, educational and housing services, while the communal areas 
were neglected (Mlambo 1997). 
The Ministry of Finance (1986) states that Africans were also denied access 
to financial resources. The white-owned banks required collateral and since 
blacks were not allowed to own land they could not use it as collateral. This 
inhibited Zimbabweans from investing in business ventures. 
Therefore, one of the major problems facing the incoming independence 
government was how to correct the imbalances of the colonial past and 
ensure that the nation's resources were distributed equitably. 
The Ministry of Finance (1986) argues that another problem at the time of 
independence in 1980 was that the economy itself was ailing. The 
international economic sanctions imposed in 1957, and the escalating 
guerrilla war, had taken a heavy toll on the country's economy by 1979. 
By the mid-1970s, the boom years of the Rhodesian economy were ending as 
the import-substitution industrialization strategy had run its course. The 
economy, which had been growing at an average annual rate of 8% between 
1967 and 1974, had reached a plateau and had began to slide (Ministry of 
Finance 1986). 
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Furthermore, the regional political situation changed to Rhodesia's 
disadvantage. Zambia closed its border in 1973, Mozambique, free from 
Portuguese rule, closed its border in 1976. Sanctions could now be enforced 
more effectively. 
Renwick (1981, p.60) highlights the problem: 
.. . the cumulative effects of the decline in economic activity since 1975 
were serious. GOP declined by over 12% in real terms with a 20% fall 
in real per capita income. Agricultural production in real terms had 
declined progressively since 1975 . . . Rhodesia experienced in this 
period a 30% deterioration in the terms of trade, with the increases in 
the prices of imports far outstripping export prices. 
The escalating guerrilla war, which had intensified in 1972, wrecked havoc on 
the country's agricultural sector. Insecurity in the countryside severely 
disrupted the agricultural economy as white farmers abandoned their farms 
and either moved into cities or emigrated. The country's lucrative tourist 
industry was disrupted by the war. Tourist traffic declined from 339 210 
visitors to a mere 87 943 visitors between 1976 and 1979. By 1979, net 
foreign currency earnings had dwindled from $27 million Rand in 1975 to $9.2 
million Rand (Mlambo 1997). 
In addition, the war took a heavy toll on the country's economic infrastructure. 
By 1979, over 2000 schools had been damaged, while 155 out of the 
country's 450 rural hospitals had been closed. By 1980, approximately 20% 
(1.4 million) of the country's population was living in refugee camps in the 
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neighboring countries. These had to be brought back to Zimbabwe and 
looked after by the incoming government (Mlambo 1997). 
Thus, Zimbabwe's inheritance was not as good as one might first imagine. 
However, the government stated that its reform agenda on education, health 
and housing services would be provided to the majority. Land would be 
redistributed more equitably; the government would take control of the 
"commanding heights" of the economy or, in the government's terminology, 
'strategic industries'; the country's independence and interests would be 
jealously guarded and economic development would be targeted at promoting 
equity. This would be funded through income generated by the economy, 
which was expected to grow rapidly (Mlambo 1997). 
Large strides where made in the provision of health and education after 
independence. These achievements are listed below: 
• 'primary school enrollments rose (1.2 million in 1980 - 2.2 million in 1989), 
• secondary enrollments rose from 74 000 to 671 000 in the same time 
period, 
• health and population - the number of fully immunized children tripled 
from 25% to 86% of the relevant population 
• infant mortality declined from 86 to 61 per 1000 births, 
• life expectancy rose from 55 to 59 years, and 
• population growth rate had fallen to an estimated 2.8% per annum in 1989' 
Zimbabwe: A Framework For Economic Reform (1991-1995) (1991, p. 10). 
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Although real GDP growth averaged 6% and annual per-capita GDP growth 
averaged 2%, economic progress during the 1980-1990 period failed to meet 
the expectations of the Zimbabwean government. It was generally felt that the 
current economic system was not allowing Zimbabwe to reach its full 
economic potential (Zimbabwe Government 1990, 1 ). 
Growth in Gross Domestic Product during the 1980 -1989 period was 6% per 
annum and lagged behind population growth (Zimbabwe: A Framework For 
Economic Reform (1991-1995), 1991). 
By the late 1980s, it was clear that Zimbabwe's growth was being severely 
constrained by its economic policies. Foreign currency shortages, an anti-
competitive environment, high unemployment, high inflation, price controls 
and a government budget deficit that was considered to be too large were the 
factors that were cited as leading to the low growth. These were the main 
reasons cited by the Zimbabwean government in its major policy document, 
(Zimbabwe: A Framework For Economic Reform (1991-1995) 1991). 
The bulk of the additional formal sector employment during the 1980s was in 
the government sector, especially in health, education and public 
administration. This was a deliberate effort to redress the historical inequities. 
Unfortunately, it was not matched by employment growth in other sectors of 
the economy, particularly in small-scale sector enterprises. Attention had to 
focus on investment in other sectors of the economy and on employment 
creation, especially in small-scale sector activities. Consideration had to be 
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given to a framework within which the informal sector could operate. It was 
only then that the nation's need for growth and employment opportunities 
could be effectively and continually met (Zimbabwe: A Framework For 
Economic Reform (1991-1995), 1991). 
The central government's fiscal deficit was in excess of 10% of GDP during 
the 1980's and this led to its debt reaching 71% of GDP by 1989 (36% 
external debt) (Zimbabwe: A Framework For Economic Reform (1991-1995), 
1991 ). 
With the total public sector debt at 90% of GDP in 1990, a major reason for 
the large budget deficit was investment by the government in the economy via 
publicly owned enterprises. Unfortunately, the economic performance of the 
majority of the state-owned enterprises was not impressive, to say the least. 
Ineptitude on the part of management, corruption and too much government 
interference in the day-to-day running of the enterprises made these 
enterprises, with a few notable exceptions, commercial disasters (Zimbabwe: 
A Framework For Economic Reform (1991-1995), 1991 ). 
For example, Air Zimbabwe, which was set up in 1980, lost money every year 
throughout the decade (1980-1990), with the exception of 1981. Between 
1982 and 1986, Air Zimbabwe's annual losses increased from Z$4.4 million to 
Z$28.2 million. To prevent the collapse of the airline, the government had to 
pump colossal amounts of money in the form of subsidies at taxpayers' 
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expense into Air Zimbabwe. Between 1984 and 1990, the Government 
subsidized the airline by Z$140 million. 
Other government-owned enterprises, such as the Agricultural Marketing 
Board (AMB), Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Cold Storage Commission 
(CSC) and Dairy Marketing Board (0MB) lost money throughout the 1980-
1990 decade. This performance is shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Government owned enterprise deficits, 1980-1987 (Z$M) 
Year AMB GMB csc DMB CMB 
1980 30.37 33.14 12.20 -2.20 -2.94 
1981 32.51 10.87 20.47 10.21 -9.05 
1982 46.07 29.66 10.98 5.53 -0.08 
1983 25.14 8.96 9.12 7.75 -0.69 
1984 25.12 6.70 9.52 8.16 -0.74 
1985 16.08 7.08 4.84 7.99 -3.83 
1986 51.24 33.76 5.37 6.00 6.12 
1987 32.10 3.04 12.13 9.70 7.23 
Source: World Bank, Zimbabwe Agriculture Sector Memorandum 
(Washington D.C., World Bank, 1981), 7., in Mlambo 1997. 
Inflation averaged around 15% per annum during the 1980's. With nominal 
interest rates averaging 12%, the real interest rate was negative. 
Nevertheless, limited consumer options and the presence of savings 
institutions helped to maintain a savings rate of about 20% per annum. These 
savings, coupled with negative real interest rates and low private investment 
demand, allowed the central government to finance its fiscal deficits of over 
10% of GDP (Zimbabwe: A Framework For Economic Reform (1991-1995), 
1991 ). 
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The principal cause of low growth had been the low level of investment in the 
productive sectors of the economy. Investment had been barely adequate to 
maintain the capital stock, let alone to increase it and raise productivity. 
Based on the poor economic performance of the economy between 1980 and 
1990, the government embarked on an Economic Structural Adjustment 
Program in October 1990. 
3.2 Policy settings 
The primary objective of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program in 
Zimbabwe was economic recovery and sustained growth. However, a more 
detailed set of objectives includes the following (Carter n.d): 
• increase in economic growth, 
• improvement of living standards, 
• reduction of unemployment, 
• constrained Government spending, 
• provide a solution for the foreign exchange problem, 
• attract foreign investors, and 
• increase exports of goods and services. 
The Government expected an economic growth rate of 5% per annum by 
1995. To achieve the overall growth target in a sustainable way, the following 
objectives had to be met (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ): 
• industrial growth was projected to be about 5.8% per year, 
• agricultural growth of about 3.2% per year, 
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• service sector growth of about 5% per year, 
• overall investment to rise to 25% of GDP, and 
• exports and imports would both have to increase as a share of 
GDP. 
Price controls were gradually eliminated; untargeted food subsidies 
disappeared, along with subsidies to major government-owned enterprises; 
foreign exchange restrictions were removed; and the exchange rate was 
allowed to float. The economic structural adjustment program was also fairly 
successful in reducing civil service employment (Zimbabwe Government 
1991 ). 
Three key areas were identified for adjustment (Zimbabwe Government 
1991 ). These were fiscal and monetary policies, trade liberalization, and 
deregulation. 
The policy document (Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-
1990) 1991) argued that the deregulation of the economy was to be 
underpinned by appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. Adjustments in 
fiscal policy would allow an increase in resources available for use in the 
productive sector. A more active use of monetary policy, combined with the 
increased use of indirect policy instruments, would mobilize and channel 
savings into the most productive uses, while reducing the rate of inflation. 
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The deficit of the central government was to be reduced to 5% of GDP 
(excluding official grants) by the financial year 1994/1995. This may be 
compared to an estimated deficit of 10.4% of GDP in the financial year 
1990/1991. This was to be achieved by the containment of recurrent 
expenditure, given Zimbabwe's relatively high tax ratio (Zimbabwe 
Government 1991 ). 
Part of the adjustment was to be achieved through improved cost recovery, 
which would increase non-tax revenues. The deficit of the public sector was 
projected to decline by more than that of the central Government deficit. The 
main reasoning was that some public enterprises that ran large operating 
losses would be generating profits by the financial year 1994/1995, while 
others were expected to break even (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ). 
Given the rate of inflation at the time, fiscal adjustment was going to be "front-
loaded". That is, the central government budget for the financial year 
1991 /1992 was to include policy measures to reduce the budget deficit by 2% 
of GDP. The front loading of the fiscal adjustment was intended to release 
resources early in the program to support the restructuring of production in the 
private sector (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ). 
The cut in net recurrent expenditure over the program was to be achieved by: 
• virtual elimination of subsidies to public enterprises (3. 7% of GDP in 
1990/1991 ), 
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• reduction in the civil service wage bill (from 16.5% of GDP in 1990/1991 to 
12.9% of GDP in 1994/1995), 
• public service monopolies to remain in government hands, but to be 
rehabilitated as commercially viable enterprises, 
• viable commercial entities operating in a competitive environment to be 
operated on a commercial basis, 
• non-viable commercial or industrial entities to be liquidated, 
• entities with a social role which duplicates that of another entity to be 
closed or merged, and 
• entities with a valid social role to be maintained in government hands and 
rehabilitated (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ). 
In terms of the background to monetary policy and financial sector reform, the 
accelerated inflation and the deterioration in the balance of payments were 
associated with the rapid expansion of domestic credit and monetary 
aggregates. The program was to focus on monetary and credit policy to 
reduce the rate of inflation to 10% by 1995, consistent with the fiscal and 
balance of payments targets (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ). 
As the fiscal deficit was brought under control, the government was committed 
to eliminating, in stages, the system of administered interest rates by 1995. 
By then, the government had hoped to refrain from the policy of setting 
interest rates on government stock of all maturties, allowing interest rates to 
be determined by marketforces (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ). 
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During this transition period to a fully market-determined interest rate, the 
authorities would enforce monetary restraint (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ). 
Efficiency in the financial sector was to be considerably enhanced by the entry 
of new banks and other financial institutions, both domestic and foreign. 
Further, a gradual approach was to be adopted. The aim was to increase 
domestic competition between financial institutions by 1993 (Zimbabwe 
Government 1991 ). 
The government was also committed to a phased process of trade 
liberalization and to move from a foreign exchange allocation system to a 
market-based system by 1995. This program was to be phased in over five 
years to allow stronger sectors to benefit from the removal of constraints on 
their export performance, while permitting weaker sectors to adapt and new 
investment to take place as opportunities became available (Zimbabwe 
Government 1991 ). 
As the foreign exchange allocation system would be phased out, tariffs would 
be the only principal source of modest protection for local producers. Almost 
all tariff rates would range from 0 to 30% from 1991 onwards. The surtax on 
imports, which was then 20% across the board, would be reduced to 10% by 
1993 (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ). 
The government recognized that import liberalization needed to be 
underpinned by an appropriate exchange rate policy. The average real 
A I) 
exchange rate against Zimbabwe's major trading partners had already fallen 
by 20% over 1989 and 1990. This had increased market incentives for 
exporters and made local producers more competitive vis-a-vis imports. The 
government's policy was to maintain an exchange rate regime, which would 
continue the existing resource shift in favor of export sectors, and sustain 
export competitiveness. This was expected to support exports and promote 
efficient import competition (Zimbabwe Government 1991 ). 
3.3 Economic structural adjustment programs: results and lessons 
learnt 
Drawing on research on Zimbabwe's economy during the structural 
adjustment program period, Carter (n.d) presents the following results of the 
economic structural adjustment program in operation over the 1990-1995 
period . 
a) Economic recovery and sustained growth: The planned GDP 
growth of 5% for Phase 1 (1990-1995) was hardly reached, partly due 
to the drought of the early 1990's. During Phase I, the average growth 
rate was 1.6%. Graph 3.0 shows the annual GDP growth over the 
1980 to 2000 period. 
Agriculture, a traditional export earner, had an average production 
growth rate of about 1.5% per annum over the 1990-1995 period. It 
never reached the required policy growth rate of 3.2%. 
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Graph 3.0: Annual GDP Growth, 1980 -2000 (%) 
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However, Zimbabwe's horticultural exports were the only noticeable 
success. In 1985, this Zimbabwean high value exporting industry was 
valued at only Z$ 3 million; it exceeded Z$1.2 billion in 1997, with very 
successful European exports and a boom in rose exports. 
Mining, a key industry in Zimbabwe's export sector, performed badly in 
the later years of the policy. Virtually all-metal prices fell. The huge 
Hartley Platinum project (a joint venture with BHP of Australia - which 
invested US$ 264 million for its 67% stake - and Delta Gold who owns 
the other 33% stake) was planned to produce 3% of the world's supply 
in 1997. Unfortunately, this target was never reached. 
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During the period between 1990 and 1995, the annual growth rate for 
the manufacturing sector was about 1.3%. This sector of the economy 
did not even come close to reaching the required growth rate of 5.8% 
set in policy document. 
The slowdown in manufacturing was reflected in the general slowdown 
of activity, especially in the investment goods sector. Whilst 
devaluation boosted exports, domestic demand fell sharply in the 
vehicle, construction and investment goods sectors. 
b) Financial resources: Devaluation aided exports in Z$ terms, but not in 
US$ terms. In 1996, the balance of payments was healthy, with a 
trade surplus of US$275 million. This, along with net capital inflows of 
some US$250 million, ensured a modest overall balance of payments 
deficit of US$ 50 million. With healthy exports of tobacco, gold and 
tourism, the balance of payments position remained quite stable until 
adversely affected by the deteriorating Zimbabwe dollar. 
c) Economic efficiency: Inflation averaged more than 20% in Phase 
1 (1990-1995), with bank base interest rates reaching in excess of 40%. 
Graph 3.1 shows that from 1990 inflation increased, reaching a rate of 
about 43% in 1993. It dropped somewhat from this level in 1994 but 
stayed above 20% until 1998. 
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Graph 3.1: Inflation, consumer prices (annual%) 
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d) Exchange rates: In spite of rising tobacco exports, the collapse of 
imports in 1997 as a result of devaluation was followed by dramatic Z$ 
exchange rate collapse. From an exchange rate of US$ 0.4 to Z$1 in 
1985, and in 1996 stood at Z$40 to US$1. 
e) Employment creation and wages: Real per capita incomes had 
changed little from their 1980 Independence levels up until the start of 
ESAP. But, from the adoption of EASP there was a steep decline in 
real wages (Marembo, 1997). 
The population was increasing at 3.1 % per annum and, with a 
estimated 300,000 school leavers coming onto the labor market 
annually and employment growth of a mere 15,000 jobs a year, 
unemployment levels, were estimated at about 33%. The school 
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leavers' situation was exacerbated by the number of retrenched civil 
servants (part of the ESAP policy), urban drift and high inflation. 
There were some positive signs in the service industries - with new 
firms in telecommunications, insurance, and banking. But these were 
not large enough to 'mop up' the high unemployment. 
f) The Public Sector and the budget: Due to the lack of transparency, 
the budget situation is both difficult to assess and confusing. What is 
known is that the budget deficit had been unacceptably high in 
conventional terms (ranging from between 2% and 10% of GDP 
between 1990 and 1995). 
Privatization was being tackled, but in a generally ambivalent and 
confused matter. The public sector wage bill still absorbed some 30% 
of current spending, and service quality was not good. 
g) Social aspects: The removal of food subsidies led to many 
Zimbabweans not being able to afford the most basic goods. Removal 
of subsidies on medical services meant that the majority of the 
population stopped seeking treatment because they could not afford it. 
In rural health centers that remained open, critical drugs were always 
out of stock. 
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h) Disinvestment by Government in the public sector has been 
rather slow: All but one of the large Agricultural marketing boards had 
been privatized; but the 'take up' by locals was limited. However, the 
government had not privatized other state-owned enterprises that had 
been running at losses. For example, the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply 
Authority was still owned by the government and still continued to run 
at a loss. 
Hawkins ( 1994) provides a precise summary of the lessons that were learned. 
These are discussed below. The first lesson relates to institutional decay. 
That is, the best policies are not going to work without the institutional 
capacity to implement them. For example, the inadequate 
telecommunications system is a deterrent to investment; and the public 
service is demoralized and demotivated. The police system, the health 
system, and the education system all face serious under-funding. 
The second lesson is the need for accelerated implementation. Achieving this 
against the background of the institutional capacity constraints, already 
identified, is a major problem. The fact is that Zimbabwe has been living with 
policy uncertainty for as long as anyone can remember. This uncertainty is 
perpetuated and deepened by uneven implementation. 
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The third lesson is the nature of the public sector reform. The arbitrary 
decision to retrench 25% of the civil service- excluding teachers and nurses -
was a meaningless exercise. The civil service needs a root-and-branch 
reform, not just number shedding. 
The fourth lesson is that even when the supply response is achieved, it is not 
going to solve Zimbabwe's single most important problem - unemployment. 
In Zimbabwe, investment of some US$800 million in the last two and a half 
years has generated less than 35 000 new jobs. 
The final lesson concerns time frames. There is just no way that - given 
institutional decline, not to mention infrastructure decay in most African 
countries - that a three- or a five-year time horizon for structural reform 
makes any sense. Building and rebuilding of institutional capacity is going to 
take decades rather than years. There has to be culture change and that is 
not achieved in five years. Structural adjustment is going to take far longer 
than people have been led to believe. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented a brief history of the Zimbabwean economy. It 
highlighted important features such as the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence and the nature of the Zimbabwean economy at the time of 
independence in 1980. In the context of this background the reasons the 
structural adjustment program implemented in Zimbabwe in 1990 were 
explored. These reasons included: foreign currency shortages, an anti-
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competitive environment, high unemployment, high inflation, price controls, 
low levels of growth and persistant government deficit. 
Results of the structural adjustment program were discussed. The overall 
consensus of research is that the results achieved were far from the intended 
ones. With GDP growth not reaching the expected 5% per annum, 
government expenditure never decreased by the required levels, investment 
rose but did not reach the levels needed to attain growth, privatization was 
slow and the removal of subsidies on goods left many Zimbabweans unable 
to afford basic food items. 
Lessons learnt from the program were summarized. These lessons included: 
the problem of institutional decay, the problem of short time frames and the 
need for public sector reform. 
Having discussed the literature on economic structural adjustment programs 
and explored the reasons for, and the results of, such a program in 
Zimbabwe, a model of the Zimbabwean economy is developed · in the next 
chapter. This model is then used in Chapter five to evaluate alternative 
policies to those of ESAP. 
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4.0 Introduction 
Chapter 4 
Methodology 
The main objective of this chapter is to develop a simulation model of the 
Zimbabwean economy that will be used in the application and evaluation of 
alternative policies and to apply and evaluate alternative policies. 
This chapter is organized as follows: 
4.1: Theoretical framework. This section discusses the theoretical 
framework used in the development of the model. It also highlights 
why this particular framework was chosen for the modeling. 
4.2: Development of the model. In this section, the model is specified, 
model inputs defined, and an overview of the modeling is given. 
4.3: Alternative policies. The alternative policy settings to be tested using 
the model developed in section 4.2 are introduced in this section. 
4.1 Theoretical framework 
John Maynard Keynes , in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1936), explained how interest rates and total output (aggregate output 
or, equivalently, aggregate income) in the economy are determined, given a 
fixed price level. Keynes was especially interested in understanding 
movements of aggregate output because he wanted to explain why the Great 
Depression had occurred and how government policy could be used to 
increase employment in a similar economic situation. 
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In his 1936 work, Keynes introduced two important theories. First, he 
introduced the notion of aggregate demand as the sum of consumption (C), 
investment (I), Government spending (G) and net exports (NX). This 
relationship is summarized as follows: Y = C + I + G + NX 
Second, he argued that full employment could be maintained only with the 
help of government spending. Keynes highlighted the importance of 
Governments in time of the depression recession and how their spending 
could induce a recovery (Bannock, Baxter & Davis 1998). Keynes argued that 
a recession was not a long-run phenomenon, which could be left to the 
markets to sort out. A recession was simply a short-run problem stemming 
from a lack of demand. If the private sector was not prepared to spend to 
boost demand, the government should spend instead. It should do this by 
running a budget deficit and, when the recession was over and the private 
sector expenditure had recovered, the government could trim its spending and 
pay off the debts accumulated during the recession. Keynes' idea was to 
balance the government budget in the medium run, but not in the short run 
(Bannock, Baxter & Davis 1996). 
According to Bannock, Baxter & Davis (1996) Keynes' work supports the 
following four propositions: 
1. 'Aggregate demand plays a decisive role in determining the level of real 
output. 
50 
2. There is no automatic tendency for the level of savings and investment to 
be equal, as the level of investment is not primarily determined by the rate 
of interest. 
3. As a result, economies can settle at positions with high unemployment and 
exhibit no natural tendency for unemployment to fall. 
4. Governments, primarily through fiscal policy, can influence aggregate 
demand to cut unemployment' (Bannock, Baxter & Davis 1996, p. 232). 
For the purposes of this dissertation 1 a Keynesian framework serves as the 
theoretical framework because it highlights the importance of the government 
in an economy. To this extent, Keynes (1936) argued that when there is 
market failure the government should intervene to correct the failure. That is, 
by assuming non-neutrality of money, an increase or decrease in government 
expenditure would lead to an increase or decrease in aggregate demand 
respectively. In Chapter 2 it was noted that, in developing countries, 
government intervention in markets cannot easily be reduced without first 
ensuring this sector employs around 60% of the population and contributes to 
a relatively large proportion of aggregate demand. 
4.2 Development of the model 
As previously indicated, the current model is based on a simple Keynesian 
framework. By way of illustration, the circular flow model will be used to show 
how sectors of the economy interact. This model depicts the flow of goods, 
services and funds among households, firms, government, and foreigners 
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(Colander & Gamber 2002). The circular flow model is illustrated in Figure 
4.1 . 
Figure 4.1. Circular flow diagram 
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As indicated in Figure 4.1, firms sell goods and services to households in the 
goods market; households supply the factors of production in exchange for 
income in the factor market; and households and firms both borrow and save 
in the financial market. 
The connection between households, firms and the international sector exists 
because households may decide to sell their labour internationally to obtain a 
wage from overseas, or buy goods and services from overseas and to hold 
savings abroad. Firms may also obtain factors of production from overseas 
as well as selling their services and goods overseas and attract foreign 
investment. 
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From Figure 4.1, it can be seen that the Government sector has a direct 
relationship with all the other sectors in the economy. The first relationship is 
between households and firms. This relationship is simple as the government 
obtains revenue from both via taxes. Equivalently, the government sector 
also gives back transfers (e.g. subsidies and childcare assistance) to 
households and firms. 
The second interaction exists between the Government and the factor market. 
The government obtains factors of production and in return pays for the use of 
the factors of production obtained. 
The third interaction is between the Government and the goods market. The 
Government also interacts with the financial market. It, like any other sector, 
borrows and saves via the financial sector. 
The fourth relationship is with the international sector. This relationship 
shows that governments may choose to obtain factors of production and 
funds internationally. 
The circular flow diagram shows an important aspect of the economy: each 
component is linked together in one way or another. Therefore, a change in 
one component will lead to a change in another component. Thus, the model 
designed must be able show the all these effects when there is a policy 
change. 
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From the circular flow diagram, four components of an economy's GDP 
become apparent. These are, consumption, investment, government 
spending and net exports. These are the components that are paramount in 
the Keynesian framework. However, in this dissertation a developed version 
of the Keynesian equation that was presented on page 50 will be used. The 
equation has all the elements of the Keynesian equation, and explicitly 
incorporates a multiplier effect. As mentioned earlier, the model has to be 
responsive to the relationships among all of the elements. Explicit inclusion of 
the multiplier allows for this to be achieved. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, net exports (NX) are assumed to be autonomous. The equation 
underlying the model is given below: 
Y = 1/1-C1 (Co+ I+ NX + G -(C1T)] 
Where: 
Y = Gross domestic product; 
1 /1-C1 = the multiplier; 
C0 = autonomous consumption; 
I = investment; 
G = government expenditure; 
NX = net exports; 
C1 = marginal propensity to consume; and 
T = taxes (assumed to be autonomous). 
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4.3 The Model 
The approach to modeling the Zimbabwean economy taken in this 
dissertation is to develop a simulation model using STELLA Research 
Software (High Performance Systems, Inc. 2000). Development of the model 
is undertaken in two phases. 
Relying on historical data, phase one of the modeling process seeks to 
replicate the dynamics of the Zimbabwean economy for the period 1980 to 
1998. In this phase of the modeling process, trend and sensitivity analyses 
are performed on the original data. 
In phase two of the modeling process, forecasts are undertaken of the 
relevant variables and the effects of alternative policy applications are 
assessed, with a view to determining: 
• whether the alternative policies would have been more successful than the 
economic structural adjustment program implemented in 1990. 
The model inputs (consumption, investment, government spending, net 
exports and GDP) are explained below. 
4.3.1 Consumption function 
Bannock, Baxter & Davis (1998, p.76) define the consumption function as "the 
relationship between consumption and disposable income". This relationship 
shows that as disposable income increases, ceteris paribus, consumption will 
increase, though not at the same rate as disposable income in the short term. 
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However, the exact relationship between disposable income and consumption 
only holds constant under a number of assumptions: 
• 'there are no expected price level changes which might delay or 
bring forward consumption, and 
• no change takes place in the availability or the cost of credit' 
(Bannock, Baxter & Davis 1998, p. 76). 
Blanchard (2000, p. 44) denotes the functional relationship between 
consumption and disposable income as follows, 
C = C (Yd) 
Where: 
C = consumption; and 
Yd = disposable income. 
Blanchard (2000, p. 44) assumes that the relationship between consumption 
and disposable income can be given by the linear function: 
C = C0 + C1 (Yd)-
Where: 
C0 = autonomous consumption; and 
C1 = marginal propensity to consume. 
The two parameters (C0 and C1) characterize the relationship between 
consumption and disposable income. C1 shows the effect of spending an 
additional dollar of disposable income on consumption. However, there are 
some restrictions placed on the values of C1. First, it is positive. This 
indicates that an increase in disposable income will lead to an increase in 
56 
consumption. Second, C1 is less than 1. That is, consumers will consume 
only part of any increase in income, and save the rest. 
Parameter Co has a simple interpretation. It is what consumers would 
consume if their disposable income in the current year were equal to zero. 
Given these assumptions and restrictions the extended equation for the 
function may be written as follows: 
C = Co + C1 (Y - T) 
Where: 
Y = income; and 
T = taxes. 
Thus, consumption is a function of income less taxes. Higher income is 
assumed to increase consumption and higher taxes to decrease consumption. 
A simple regression was undertaken to determine autonomous consumption 
in the case of Zimbabwe. The relationship is given by: 
C =a+ b; (disposable income)+ e; 
Where: 
C = consumption, 
a= intercept term (which was calculated to be 5.483(8)), 
b; = the slope of the line (which was calculated to be 0.469), and 
e; = the random error term. 
Therefore, the regression equation becomes: 
C = 5.4838 + 0.469 (disposable income)+ e; 
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According to Blanchard (2000), autonomous consumption is consumption 
when disposable income equals zero. Therefore, the intercept of the 
regression line was used as the value for autonomous consumption. 
The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) was taken to the value for the 
slope of the line 0.469. 
4.3.2 Net exports (NX) 
For simplicity, and due to the lack of data, net exports (NX) were modeled 
simply by subtracting imports from exports. 
4.3.3 Government expenditure 
Government expenditure is assumed to be exogenous. The rationale for this 
assumption is based on two considerations: 
First, governments do not behave with the same regularity as 
consumers or firms. Therefore there is no reliable rule that could be 
written for government expenditure. Second, one of the tasks of 
macroeconomists is to advise governments on spending and tax 
decisions. Therefore, it would be unwise to look at a model in which a 
behavioral assumption has already been made (Blanchard 2000, p. 46). 
4.3.4 Investment 
Blanchard (2000, p. 83) suggests that private sector investment depends 
primarily on two factors: 
1. The level of sales. A firm facing an increase in sales needs to 
increase production. To do so, the firm may need to invest in additional 
capital equipment. A firm facing low sales will feel no such need and 
will spend little if anything on investment. 
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2. The interest rate. Basically, the higher the interest rate, the less likely 
the firm is to borrow and invest in capital equipment. At a high enough 
interest rate, the additional profits from the new capital equipment will 
not cover the interest payments. 
The investment relationship can be written as follows; 
I= I (Y, i) 
Where: 
I = investment; 
Y = production; and 
i = nominal interest rate. 
This equation states that investment depends on the level of production and 
nominal interest rates. In this model which uses real data, it is assumed that 
expected inflation equals zero. This means that the nominal interest rate (i) is 
equal to the real interest rate (r). Thus, the investment relationship is denoted 
as follows; 
I= I (Y, r) 
Where: 
r = real interest rate. 
Due to inadequate production data, investment in this model is determined 
solely as a function of the real interest rate. To develop this function, a simple 
regression was run between investment and real interest rates. The 
regression equation obtained is as follows: 
I= a - bi (real interest rate)+ ei 
Where: 
I = investment; 
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a = the intercept (which was calculated to be 3.4078); 
bi= the slope of the line (which was calculated to be 7.177); and 
ei = random error term. 
The estimated regression equation is: 
I = 3.4078 - 7.177 (real interest rate) + ei 
As indicated in the equation, the relationship between investment and real 
interest rates is negative. That is, as real interest rates decrease, investment 
increases, and vice versa. Due to rapid increases and decreases in the real 
interest rate data, a first-order exponential smoothing technique was applied 
to the real interest rates. 
4.3.5 Gross domestic product (GDP) 
As previously discussed, the value for GDP is the summation of consumption, 
investment, government expenditure and net exports. To account for the 
secondary effects of policy changes, a multiplier is incorporated in the model. 
4.4 Alternative Policies 
As previously discussed, phase two of the modeling process is concerned 
with simulating alternative policies with the model. Two alternative policies 
are presented. The first policy alternative is to increase government 
expenditure, the second policy alternative is to decrease the real interest rate. 
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Cause 
Increase 
The increase in government expenditure is representative of an expansionary 
fiscal policy. That is, by increasing government expenditure, the government 
will effectively run budget deficits to achieve its objectives. Given the nature 
of the Zimbabwean economy in 1990, the policy will involve an increase in 
capital expenditures. As a result of the increase in capital expenditures, it is 
concluded that there will be an increase in employment in the economy. 
This focus was noted in the literature review. Stiglitz (2000) put forward the 
idea that in sub-Saharan African countries the notion of reducing government 
expenditure and limiting its involvement in the economy is not the best policy. 
This is mainly due to the fact that the government is the largest employer and 
is the only institution that can foster economic growth. 
Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch (1994) discuss the effects of an increase in 
government expenditure on an economy as a whole. These effects are 
identified in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Effects of an increase in government expenditure 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
in • increase in GDP • increase in income • increase in consumption and GDP 
government • increase in disposable income • increase in real interest rates 
expenditure • increase consumption • appreciation of the exchange rate 
• increase in GDP • decrease in exports 
• increase in imports 
• decrease in GDP 
Table 4.1 shows that there are three sets of effects that are expected from 
this change, with both the second and third round effects expected to be 
captured by the multiplier. The first round effect of an increase in government 
expenditure is an increase in GDP. 
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The second round effects of this policy are that an increase in government 
expenditure leads to an increase in disposable income, and a consequent 
increase in consumption. It is expected that an increase in consumption will 
lead to a further increase in GDP. 
As indicated in Table 4.1, initially the third round effect leads to an increase in 
consumption and a further increase in GDP. This increase in GDP is 
expected to lead to an increase in interest rates. An increase in interest rates 
leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate, a subsequent decrease in 
exports, an increase in imports and a decrease in GDP. 
Although there is a decrease in GDP in round three, the initial increase in 
government expenditure should be high enough to equal and exceed this 
decrease in GDP for the policy to have the desired effect. For the purposes of 
this policy application, government expenditure has been increased by 2$500 
million. 
The second, alternative policy involves reducing the real interest rate by 
0.25%. Blanchard (2000) describes this as being representative of an 
expansionary monetary policy. The idea is that lower interest rates will allow 
firms and individuals to borrow money for capital investments at a lower cost. 
This will encourage investment. Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch (1994) describe 
the expected effects of this type of policy. These effects are summarized in 
Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2. Effects of a decrease in interest rates 
cause Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Decrease in • increase in investment • increase in investment • exchange rate depreciation 
interest rates • increase in GDP • increase in income • increase in exports 
• increase in disposable income • decrease in imports 
• increase in consumption • increase in GDP 
• increase in GDP 
The round one effect is straightforward. A decrease in interest rates leads to 
an increase in investment because the cost of funds is lower. This leads to an 
increase in GDP. Round two involves income increasing because of the 
increase in investment. This is mainly due to higher wages and more jobs 
being created by the investment. This increase leads to an increase in 
disposable income, which leads to an increase in consumption. In turn, the 
increase in consumption will lead to an increase in GDP. 
The decrease in interest rates causes the exchange rate to depreciate. This 
leads to an increase in exports and a decrease in imports. It follows from this 
that, as net exports increase, GDP will also increase. 
4.5 Summary 
In the first section of this methodology chapter, a simple macro-economic 
theoretical framework was introduced. The framework was then used to 
develop the Zimbabwean economic model. Reasons for the choice of the 
theoretical framework were presented. 
In the second section of the chapter, the model used in this study was 
developed. The circular flow diagram, showing the interrelationships within 
the economy provided a guide for the model's development. 
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Finally in the last section of the Chapter, alternative policy settings that are to 
be run using the model were introduced. The expected effects of such policy 
changes were then canvassed in terms of the underlying economic theory. 
Chapter five will present and discuss the results of both phases of the 
modeling process. 
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5.0 Introduction 
Chapter 5 
Results 
The chapter presents and evaluates the results that were obtained from 
phase one and phase two of the modeling process. 
This chapter is organized as follows: 
5.1: Results and evaluation of modeling the Zimbabwean economy (phase 
one). In this section, the results of the application model of the 
Zimbabwean economy are presented. As stated in Chapter 4, the 
evaluation of the results is undertaken in terms of trend and sensitivity 
analysis. 
5.2 : Results and evaluation of alternative policies (phase two). In this 
section, the results of the simulation of the alternative policies are 
presented. They are evaluated by comparing the base data to the 
forecasted results for the alternative policies. 
5.1 Results and evaluation of the economic model: phase one 
Overall, the model yields results that are reasonably close to the actual data 
for the period. Even though the model is overestimating, graphical analysis of 
the results shows that the model forecasts are generally mirroring the patterns 
of the original data, but with some overestimation. 
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One case of large overestimation is evident with net exports. The reason why 
this has occurred is that smoothed data for exports and imports were used, 
rather than forecasts based on prior modeling. Therefore, it is to be expected 
that the results obtained for net exports would differ from the actual net 
exports data. 
This overestimation by the model does not present a initial problem for two 
reasons. First, net exports do not play a pivotal role in the design and 
outcomes of the alternative policies. Second, the main aggregate figure for 
comparison is real GDP. Real GDP has a relatively low average percentage 
error of 14.28%. Therefore, to a certain extent, the model does portray the 
Zimbabwean economy over the period 1980-1998. Results for particular 
variables are discussed below. 
5.1.1 GDP 
Over the two control years (1999 and 2000) the model, on average, gives an 
error of 14.28%. This is shown in Table 5.0. In 1999, the model 
underestimated by about 1.5 Z$B and, in 2000, overestimated by about 5.69 
Z$B. 
Table 5.0. GDP results (billions of Z$) 
Year GDP Forecasted GDP Absolute Difference Percentage difference 
1999 26.40 24.84 1.56 5.9 
2000 25.10 30.79 5.69 22.66 
Average percentage difference 14.28% 
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5.1.2 Government expenditure 
From the results obtained, the average percentage difference for government 
expenditure is estimated at 28%. For 1999 the model underestimated by 
about 3 Z$M and, in 2000, it overestimated by about 2.4 Z$M. 
Table 5.1 Government expenditure results (2$8) 
Year Government Forecasted government Absolute Percentage difference 
expenditure expenditure Difference 
1999 3.3 3.0 0.30 9 
2000 5.1 7.5 2.40 47 
Average percentage 28% 
difference 
5.1.3 Net exports 
Table 5.2 shows that the model overestimates net exports. The average 
percentage difference was estimated at 107.5%. The cause for this problem 
was discussed earlier in the previous chapter. 
Table 5.2 Net exports results (Z$M) 
Year Net exports Forecasted net exports Absolute Difference Percentage difference 
1999 -36 64.04 100M 164 
2000 460 222.98 237M 51 
Average percentage 107.5% 
difference 
5.1.4 Consumption 
Over the control years, 1999 and 2000, the model is overestimating. In 1999 
and 2000 it overestimated by 1.4 billion and 1.7 billion respectively. The 
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average percentage error was estimated to be 10.6%. These results are 
shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Consumption results (2$8) 
Year Consumption Forecasted consumption Absolute Difference Percentage 
difference 
1999 16.60 18.03 1.43 8.6 
2000 13.50 15.22 1.72 12.7 
Average percentage 10.6% 
error 
5.1.5 Investment 
Table 5.4 shows that, on average, the model for investment is overestimating. 
In 1999, the model underestimated by 0.23 Z$B and, in 2000, the model 
overestimated by 0.71 Z$B. However, the overall percentage error for 
investment is estimated at 16%. 
Table 5.4 Investment results (2$8) 
Year Investment Forecasted investment Difference Percentage difference 
1999 3.59 3.36 -0.23 -6 
2000 2.66 3.37 +0.71 27 
Average percentage 16% 
error 
5.2 Results and evaluation of alternative policies: phase two 
5.2.1 Government Expenditure 
The government expenditure policy run on the model was an increase in 
government expenditure by Z$M 500. Table 5.5 and Graph 5.5 show the 
results of the alternative policy. Graph 5. 5 shows that a Z$M 500 increase in 
1990 leads to a increase in GDP over the 1991 - 2000 period. 
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Graph 5.0 Policy alternative one: Increase in government expenditure, 
2$500m 
Comparison of simulated GDP with actual GDP 
-+-Series1 
---- Series2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
TIME PERIODS 
Notes: 
• Series one represents , the original data and 
• series two representing the alternative policy results 
Table 5.5 Policy alternative one: Increase in government 
expenditure of 2$500m 
YEARS GDP RESULTS GDP RESULTS WITH $500m 
(Z$8) GVT EXPENDITURE INCREASE 
{Z$Bl 
1990 40.1 40 .1 
1991 39.4 44 .0 
1992 58.9 72.1 
1993 37.5 51.8 
1994 45.2 67.4 
1995 37.0 61 .8 
1996 30.7 57.8 
1997 23.9 51 .1 
1998 23.4 56.0 
1999 18.1 53 .6 
2000 26.1 76 .0 
From Table 5.5, it is evident that in period 1992 GDP rose to Z$872. 
However, in the next period it decreased to Z$51 b, but it was still higher than 
the actual GDP of Z$8 37. From this period (1992) onwards, GDP fluctuates 
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around the mid to high Z$B 50s. However, the overall trend for the results is 
upward, as shown in Graph 5.0. 
5.2.2 Interest rates 
The alternative interest rate policy run on the model was a decrease of 0.25% 
over the 1990-2000 period. Table 5.6 and Graph 5.1 show the results of the 
alternative policy. 
Graph 5.1 Policy alternative two: decrease in interest rates of 
0.25% 
Comparison of simulated GDP with actual GDP 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
TIME PERIODS 
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------- GDP RESULTS 
GDP RESULTS WITT-I A -
0.25% Cf-tl\NGE IN INTEREST 
RATES 
YEARS 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
Table 5.6 Policy alternative two: decrease in interest rates of 
0.25% 
GDP RESULTS (IN GDP RESULTS WITH A -0.25% 
2$8) CHANGE IN INTEREST RA TES 
{IN 2$B) 
40. 112 40.112 
39.451 39.456 
58.967 58.978 
37.597 37.613 
45.205 45.226 
37.003 37.029 
30.735 30.766 
23.905 23.941 
23.487 23.529 
18.105 18.152 
26.177 26.230 
As is shown in Table 5.6 and Graph 5.1, when interest rates were decreased, 
GDP increased overall, but not by a big margin. When the interest rate was 
decreased by -0.25%, GDP increased by about Z$M 20. 
The relatively small increase in GDP might be explained in terms of how the 
investment relation was modeled. With the use of regression analysis to 
model investment, the increase in GDP, or even investment, could be 
expected to be systematic. That is, by running a regression betwee_n interest 
rates and investment, an average equation on the data is effectively created 
and used to forecast. Therefore any change in interest rates could be 
assumed to have an averaged effect on investment and GDP. 
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5.3 Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the model of the Zimbabwe economy 
developed in the study and for the simulation of alternative policies using that 
model. Despite general overestimation being shown by the modei, it was 
concluded that the model was appropriate for analysis of the alternative 
polices. Using the model, two alternative policies were simulated and the 
results presented. The first alternative policy, an increase in government 
expenditure by Z$M 500, resulted in a increase in GDP. The second 
alternative policy, a cut in interest rates by 0.25%, resulted in a small increase 
in GDP. 
Given these results, the final chapter concludes the dissertation; it highlights 
the limitations of the study and presents further possible areas of research. 
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6.0 Summary 
Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusions 
The main aim of the dissertation, as outlined in Chapter one, was to develop 
an economic simulation model of the Zimbabwean economy using historical 
data for the period 1980-2000. This model was developed using STELLA 8 
software. The model developed was used to cater for the second aim of the 
dissertation; the simulation of alternative policies to ESAP. In Chapter four, 
this exercise was called 'phase one' of the modeling. 
In chapter two, a brief discussion of the theoretical framework underlying 
economic structural adjustment was presented. Drawing heavily on Stiglitz 
(2000), ESAP was discussed in terms of the three main pillars of the 
'Washington Consensus': budget austerity, privatization and liberalization 
Problems arising from the consensus were identified. First, as had been 
suggested by Blanchard (2000), budget austerity could cause a recession in 
developing countries because it would effectively reduce aggregate demand. 
Second, as argued by Stiglitz (2002), liberalization was likely to enhance a 
country's income but, if not implemented properly, could lead to high levels of 
unemployment with local firms being forced out of business by foreign 
competitors. Finally, as Stiglitz (2002) noted, privatization faces 
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implementation problems. Preconditions have to be satisfied before 
privatization can contribute to an economy's growth, and the way privatization 
is implemented makes a big difference to economic performance. 
In chapter three, a discussion of the Zimbabwean economy was presented. 
The discussion covered a range of aspects that were important for this 
dissertation, for example, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the 
nature of the Zimbabwean economy at the time of independence in 1980, and 
reasons why a structural adjustment program had been implemented in 
Zimbabwe in 1990. These reasons included: foreign currency shortages, an 
anti-competitive environment, high unemployment, high inflation, price 
controls, low levels of growth and a high government deficit. 
Results from the implementation of the ESAP program were also presented 
and discussed in Chapter three. The conclusion of the discussion was that the 
results achieved were far from the intended ones. With GDP growth not 
reaching the expected 5% per annum (1990 -1995), government expenditure 
never decreased by the required levels, investment rose but did not reach the 
levels needed to attain growth, privatization was slow, and the removal of 
subsidies on goods left many Zimbabweans unable to afford basic food items. 
Given these results, the lessons learnt from the program were summarized. 
The lessons included: the problem of institutional decay, the impracticability of 
short time frames and the need for public sector reform. 
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In Chapter four the simulation model of the Zimbabwean economy was 
developed. The development began with a brief discussion of a Keynesian, 
simple macro-economic framework. This was the framework used to develop 
the Zimbabwean simulation model. The reasons for the choice of the 
particular theoretical framework were discussed as well. 
Using a circular flow diagram to show the interrelationships among sections of 
the economy, the model constructed reflected the linkages between the 
various sectors and assumptions made about the economic relationships. 
This chapter also presented an introduction to phase two of the modeling 
process - the alternative policy settings and their expected effects. 
In Chapter five the results for both the developed test model (phase one) and 
the alternative policy simulations (phase two) were presented, together with a 
discussion of these results. The results of the phase one modeling indicated 
that the model, in general, was overestimating. However, given the reasons 
for such estimation, the conclusion reached was that the model was 
appropriate for the testing of the alternative polices. 
The results for phase two modeling indicated that alternative policies may 
have been preferred. The first alternative policy, an increase in government 
expenditure, resulted in a large increase in GDP. The second alternative 
policy, a decrease in interest rates by 0.25%, also resulted in an increase in 
GDP, but not by a large amount. Therefore, the conclusion reached was that 
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the chosen alternative policies would have produced better results than the 
ESAP program. 
6.1 Limitations of the research 
The main limitations of this research were the paucity of data and the lack of 
prior research on Zimbabwe's economy. The data used in the modeling of the 
Zimbabwean economy was obtained from the World Bank Development 
Indicators CD-ROM (2004). Although essential data was obtained, data for 
other variables such as money supply, money demand, and investment were 
unobtainable. This limited the development of a more comprehensive and 
extensive model needed to test alternative policies. For example, net exports 
were modeled by simply subtracting exports from imports. If data had been 
available, imports and exports could have been modeled more adequately. 
This could have altered the results for the alternative policies. Also other 
indicators could have been used to evaluate the results. For example, 
unemployment, inflation, net exports and relative changes in the real income 
of the population. 
Another limitation was the lack of accessible of research on Zimbabwe's 
economy. This complicated the process of developing the test model 
because there was little prior research from which to begin. Consequently, a 
highly aggregated test model had to be built to simulate the Zimbabwean 
economy and test the alternative policies. 
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This lack of evident research also limited the number of alternative policies 
tested. The model does, however, present an opportunity to test alternative 
policies that may be proposed by other researchers. The alternative policies 
tested in the dissertation were formulated on the basis of the model 
developed and its ability to test them, with the results mainly focused on GDP 
changes. 
6.2 Implications for future research 
As indicated in section 6.1, lack of prior research restricted the development 
of a more detailed model with superior testing ability. Having developed a 
highly aggregated model of the Zimbabwean economy, and tested some 
alternative policies, an opportunity exists for prospective researchers to 
develop such a model using the STELLA 8 software that can test more 
detailed alternative policies. For example, the model could be developed to 
incorporate the determinants of imports and exports, to show unemployment 
and inflation rates for the economy and income distribution. Such an 
extension of the model could be used by government to simulate and test 
prospective policies. 
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